The Implications of the “No-Fly Zone”

Operation “Odyssey Dawn”, the U.S.’ pseudonym for the military intervention in Libya, has now been under way for three days. Cruise missiles have struck strategic targets throughout Libya, a U.S. fighter plane has crashed, but Gadhafi remains as defiant as ever. It’s beginning to look as if the UN’s authorization and backing for the establishment of a “no-fly zone” in Libya is going to be far more costly than anyone had planned.

To be clear, the establishment of a “no-fly zone” is an act of war. It does not “seem” like we are at war because we have not made any long-term commitments or deployed ground forces. Firing missiles at another state’s infrastructure is, without a doubt, an act of war. However, we have given this operation the neat label of a “no-fly zone”, fooling the masses into oblivion per usual. How could I say such things when we are trying to help the downtrodden Libyan people rise up against their oppressive leader? Simple, read on.

I am not pro-Gadhafi or anti-rebel. In fact, I hope the rebel forces succeed. However, I wish they did so on their own, because this is just the beginning of either another failed U.S.-led intervention or a long commitment to backing the rebel forces.

Simply put, the revolution needs to be organic. Meaning, it has to come out of the Libyan people and be won by the Libyan people, just like in Tunisia and Egypt, where no US or UN intervention occurred. Throughout all of history, revolutions, by-and-large, develop within the masses and are won by the masses. When victory is had, the losers flee, are exiled, or purged because they are incompatible with the new regime, unless they willing submit and participate. For example, when the Americans secured victory in the Revolutionary war, British loyalists had already returned to Great Britain or fled elsewhere, been killed in the war, or accepted defeat and were allowed to participate in the new society .

Regardless, if the U.S. and other UN-backing states were to support the rebels (like the French did for the American Revolutionaries) we must make a clear and long-term commitment. The U.S. and other allied forces could contribute supplies and munitions to the Libyan rebels, aiding in their quest for victory. Yet, even if this type of support is given, there is still a great chance of the rebels being overrun by pro-Gadhafi forces. The Libyan rebels are too lightly armed, small in number, undertrained, and inefficient at coordinating combat strategies . By authorizing the establishment of a “no-fly zone” the UN is effectively taking sides in the situation—the correct side I might add. However, this is a half-hearted commitment. Without ground support (something which I am completely against), pro-Gadhafi forces may very well overrun the rebel fighters. This would result in yet another example of the failure of the U.S. (and other Allied forces) to successfully aid the downtrodden, making our intervention a waste of time, money, and life.

In contrast to the relatively peaceful outcome of the organic Revolutionary war, the modern-day Iraqi example proves, intervention in another state’s internal activities, criminal or not, makes securing success difficult. Those who supported the previous Iraqi regime and/or disagree with the American-implemented new regime, through insurgency tactics, are making progress difficult. A similar situation will occur in Libya; with such a sharp divide between Gadhafi loyalists and his opponents, there is absolutely no way that success can be had with a half-hearted external commitment, and not enough organic internal support on behalf of the underpowered rebel fighters. Even if success is had, all pro-Gadhafi supporters would need to be eliminated (inhumane in and of itself), exiled (which no longer occurs in the modern world), or if willing (though highly unlikely), allowed to partake in the new democracy. Otherwise, just like the insurgent situation in Iraq, if the rebels were to win, they would most likely suffer years of insurgency and attempted overthrow. In this case, once in power, the new government would have to resort opposition-crushing tactics, nearly the exact reason behind the rebel uprisings against the Gadhafi regime.

Once again we, the U.S. and UN allied forces, have gotten ourselves into quite a mess. We are doing the right thing on the behalf of the Libyan people, but success is going to be extremely difficult to achieve given the low level of commitment we are willing to provide. If the situation culminates in failure, one can only wonder what Islamic states are going to think of another US-led failed attempt at intervention in a Middle-Eastern state, or how other states will view the U.S. as a leading world power.